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Abstract 
 
The European gas market reform triggered new market designs which aimed to 
achieve competitive natural gas prices, efficiency gains, and security of gas supply. 
The paper analyses to what extent the effects of regulation-for-competition on eco-
nomic performance in the form of natural gas prices, network tariffs, efficiency gains, 
and investments in gas infrastructure can be empirically studied in a European wide 
comparative analysis. We demonstrate that conceptual and data constraints hinder the 
verification of the impact of regulation-for-competition on those performance indica-
tors. Natural gas prices remain oil-indexed and new investment projects are in practice 
exempted from competition measures. Assuming that a positive impact is a matter of 
fact is thus premature. A hold-up problem (where industry is reluctant to invest due to 
regulatory uncertainty and a lack of incentives) is difficult to quantify empirically. 
However, the industry’s strong opposition to ownership unbundling coupled with the 
popularity of exemptions from third party access while still allowing long-term con-
tracts does indicate that the general argument in favour of a hold-up problem has em-
pirical relevance.  
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1. Introduction  
Ten years after the introduction of European gas market reform, consumers, politicians and 
industry are asking to be shown the benefits of the reform. In the course of the ongoing 
evaluation and enforcement phase, impact assessments are evolving to analyse the economic 
outcomes (exemplary ECORYS Nederland BV 2006; European Commission 2007b; Euro-
pean Commission 2007e)1. Yet it is clear that the progress of the European gas reform, as 
well as its effects, have fallen behind expectations. In 2005, the European Commission 
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1 In 2006, the Dutch regulator commissioned an evaluation of energy sector liberalisation to display the 
cost and benefits of the national gas reform. The introduction of the “Gaswet” (gas liberalisation law) 
caused administrative costs of 13.6 million Euros in 2002. A comparison of costs with or without the 
Gaswet is not possible (ECORYS Nederland BV 2006: 68). 
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had already reported severe malfunctions such as market concentration, lack of liquidity 
in the gas market and insufficient market integration and harmonisation (2005: 271). Al-
though research on utility reforms in general and natural gas in particular is flourishing, 
cross-national comprehensive studies empirically analysing the correlation between regu-
lation-for-competition and economic performance in gas markets are lacking. Neverthe-
less, opponents of the reform attribute malfunctions in the sector to the introduction of 
competition, whereas proponents claim the unfavourable economic performance occurred 
because the reform has not been far reaching enough. The authors take a step back from 
this heated political debate and offer a scientific perspective on the matter. In the paper it 
is addressed to what extent the effects of regulation-for-competition on economic per-
formance (in the form of natural gas prices, network tariffs, efficiency gains, and invest-
ments) can be empirically studied in a European wide comparative analysis. The conclu-
sion is straightforward: A verification of whether the European Union’s gas reform 
reached its reform goals - affordable prices, efficiency gains and security of gas supply2 - 
while keeping up positivist academic standards appears to be an insurmountable obstacle. 
The paper outlines the conceptual and practical obstacles of analysing the correlation be-
tween regulation-for-competition and economic performance in European gas markets.  
2. Regulation and economic performance – a literature review 
“In economic theory, ownership and the degree of competition are both important factors 
in determining output levels, costs of production and prices. More formally, the capital 
market and the product market determine the level of allocative and productive effi-
ciency. Therefore, privatization, competition and more effective state regulation of mo-
nopoly activities should lead to improved economic performance.” (Zhang 2002: 3) In 
theory, the structure-conduct performance paradigm (scp paradigm) is straight forward, 
but in practice this piece of economic wisdom is heavily contested. After a world wide 
wave of privatization, liberalization and sector reforms the scientific analysis of the vari-
able triangle consisting of competition, privatization (ownership) and regulation and its 
effect on economic performance received a lot of attention and resulted in numerous em-
pirical studies. A positivist strand of literature searches for correlation between these 
variables by conducting econometric analyses which are single or multi-equation models 
conducting cross-country analysis. Steiner elaborates on the advantage of this type of 
analysis by criticising the state of literature examining the effects of electricity liberalisa-
tion: “It is difficult to draw general policy conclusions from existing empirical work that 
focuses rather on far-reaching reforms in a single market or other country-specific anec-
dotal discussion of regulatory change because neither type of study separates the effect of 
regulatory reform from country-specific features” (2001: 145). Instead, she proposes a 
comparable cross-country study on the basis of panel data. A regression analysis enables 
the exploitation of cross-national and time series dimensions, whereby country specific 
features can be controlled for. The following paragraph surveys the main results that 
econometric research has recently brought about to test the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm.  
                                                 
2 Security of supply is often reduced to a buzzword or a black-box concept. Here it is defined “as the guar-
antee that all the gas volumes, demanded by non-interruptible (firm or protected) customers, will be avail-
able at a reasonable price.” (Luciani 2004) 
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The empirical studies analyse network based industries such as aviation, telecom, gas, 
electricity, railways, postal services and water. In the group of utility industry studies, 
sector studies examining the telecommunication and electricity sector are prevalent. The 
literature covers member countries of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development, developing countries and regions like Latin America or Eastern Europe. 
To the best of our knowledge, the literature search did not reveal any study on natural gas 
markets, which systematically explore the causal relationship between ownership, market 
concentration, regulation and their effect on economic performance in the form of a 
cross-national comparative econometric analysis. Despite the knowledge that the Euro-
pean electricity and gas markets differ in many ways, the sectors are the most comparable 
among the utility industries and the two share significant common features. Both markets 
are in the energy field, network based, characterised by high sunk costs and have been 
liberalised shortly one after the other. Major distinctions stem from different supply 
structures, and applied technologies. In contrast to electricity, gas can on the one hand be 
stored more economically, but on the other hand different gas qualities demand complex 
technological solutions to allow gas transport across Europe. Due to the lack of research 
on natural gas in this field and some common features of electricity and natural gas sec-
tors, we choose to refer mainly to electricity markets in our analysis.  
Zhang et. al. demonstrate in their literature review that the surveyed empirical results 
show no clear evidence as to whether privately owned, competitive markets are more ef-
ficient than publicly owned monopolized markets (2002). Vickers and Yarrow attribute 
contradicting effects of privatisation on performance in earlier research days to the focus 
on ownership (1988). Therefore, recent research advocates to incorporate several factors 
summarised under the variables privatisation, competition and regulation to explain the 
effect on economic performance (Zhang, Parker et al. 2002). In practice, the bulk of stud-
ies do not include all three variables but often concentrate on one or two independent 
variables, be it privatization and competition or privatization and regulation. A number of 
empirical works associated competition with lower costs, lower prices, and higher pro-
ductive efficiency (Kwoka 1996; Kleit and Terrell 2001; Martin and Vansteenkiste 2001). 
Zhang et. al. reached the same conclusion when assessing the effects of privatization, 
competition, and regulation on the performance of the electricity generation industry in 
51 developing countries through the period 1985-2000. Competition positively effects 
service penetration, capacity expansion, labour efficiency and prices to industrial users. 
According to Zhang, privatization and regulation on their own do not lead to obvious 
gains in economic performance. Consequently the introduction of competition is key to 
achieving positive effects such as higher efficiency and productivity (Zhang, Parker et al. 
2002). Another two articles apply a complex research design analysing the impact of 
regulation, industry structure and privatization performance in the electricity supply in-
dustry of OECD countries (Steiner 2001; Hattori and Tsutsui 2004). Although the two 
studies are very similar in terms of scope and methodology, the results concerning the 
impact of regulatory reforms in electricity supply industry on end-user gas prices are par-
tially contradictory3. Steiner and Hattori/Tsutsui use the identical sample of OECD coun-
tries for the period 1987-1999, applying the same basic framework for model specifica-
                                                 
3 Steiner admits price data is not available for the generation market but only for the retail market. Instead, 
she uses an artifice claiming “generation prices are assumed to be a mean-shifted version of retail prices”. 
(Steiner 2001: 166)  
 3
tion and estimation. The main difference is that Hattori and Tsutsui offer results for ran-
dom and fixed effects, whereas Steiner only takes into account random effect models 
(Nagayama 2007). Steiner’s time frame covers only the years from 1986 to 1996 and 
Hattori and Tsutsui attribute some of the differences in results to the 3 year time differ-
ence. Both extracted the price data from Energy Prices and Taxes published by the Inter-
national Energy Agency. However, the way variables are operatonalised differ. For in-
stance Hattory and Tsutui consider that the unbundling of transmission system operators 
are only fulfilled when legal unbundling is in place, whereas Steiner regards account un-
bundling as sufficient (2004: 825). Hattori and Tsutsui findings suggest that the existence 
of wholesale pool markets do positively correlate with lower prices, whereas Steiner ob-
serves the contrary. Both observe a negative correlation between the introduction of third 
party access and lower electricity retail prices, but differ with regard to the statistical sig-
nificance of this observation. In Hattori and Tsutsui’s analysis third-party access is statis-
tically significantly, whereas Steiner concludes it is statistically insignificant. The com-
parison illustrates how crucial the exact operationalization is with regard to its effects on 
statistical significance. Furthermore, the brief review suggests more research is needed 
beyond 2000 to draw more solid conclusions on the correlation between specific regula-
tory instruments and its empirical effect on electricity prices. In the following sections we 
will continue our literature review by portraying the operationalization of the variables of 
regulation and economic performance in econometric studies and refer to their results. 
Moreover, we will display how those variables have been operationalised to analyse the 
effects of the gas sector reform on economic performance.   
3. Regulatory variables and the use of regulatory indices in econometric models  
Early econometric models analysing the impact of regulation on the performance of in-
dustries have appeared in simple designs. The regulation variable was reduced to a 
dummy variable indicating whether an independent regulator was present or not 
(Wallsten 2001; Zhang, Parker et al. 2002; Stern 2007). While the research agenda was 
progressing, more complex operationalisations were applied (Gutierrez 2003; Stern 2003; 
Cubbin and Stern 2006; Edwards and Waverman 2006). The new indices consisted of 
between 4 to 12 indicators. When applied to developing countries, the regulation variable 
is interpreted as a measure of policy credibility. Here, the independence of the jurisdic-
tion and the overall stability of the political system in ensuring the property rights of for-
eign investors is at the forefront, whereas the institutional endowment and independence 
of regulatory authorities is addressed in studies focusing on developed countries 
(Bergara, Henisz et al. 1997). According to Stern, studies analysing the telecommunica-
tion and electricity sectors generally confirm that regulation does have a significant posi-
tive impact on infrastructural industries (Stern 2007: 162). Moreover, the impact of regu-
lation is more accurately estimated if an index of regulatory characteristics.  
The studies referred to above only take the formal dimension of regulation into consid-
eration. Indices describe the de jure regulation or the properties of regulators. Currently, 
the actual implementation practices, or the regulatory quality, are not analysed, but re-
search trends are moving in this direction (Stern 2007). Oxera Consulting offers an ex-
ample of a wider interpretation of regulation. In their report commissioned by the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) Department for Trade and Industry, Oxera measured the competition in 
electricity and gas markets across the European Union (EU) and G7 countries. Using an 
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applied index, the consulting company assessed not only the de jure regulatory instru-
ments but also the de facto institutional arrangements in the form of contract characteris-
tics, industry structure and customer behaviour. Further, indicators have been grouped 
along the various parts of the value chain (upstream, wholesale, downstream, network-
related activities) which allows one to assess the degree of competition at different mar-
ket levels (Oxera 2003). The Oxera study serves as a good starting point and source of 
inspiration for developing a more complex index to assess regulatory performance. How-
ever, due to Oxera’s focus on general competition, its appropriateness to operationalise 
regulation-for-competition is limited. For assessing regulatory regimes in the natural gas 
sector we draw on an earlier study produced jointly with the Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies in which we analysed the degree of convergence towards best-practice regulation 
(Haase 2008)4. This study focused on the formal aspects of regulatory regimes5. To cap-
ture different dimensions of regulatory regimes, the assessment distinguishes between 
regulatory functions and regulatory competencies. Regulatory functions along the gas 
value chain account for the applied regulatory instruments, whereas regulatory compe-
tencies describe the competencies and institutional endowment of the national regulatory 
authorities.  
4. Economic performance  
Performance indicators such as natural gas price and investment are usually in the centre 
of public attention. Efficiency gains are less prominent in politically-driven evaluations; 
they are to a larger extent the subject of academic interest. The obvious reason for diver-
gent popularity of performance indicators is related to the nature of those indicators. For 
example, changes of gas prices are clearly visible on the energy bill of voting consumers. 
Underinvestment sooner or later translates into dysfunctions of the system in the form of 
‘blackouts’ (negative externalities). Efficiency appears less tangible in the public percep-
tion.  
The European Union set ambitious targets in terms of economic performance to be ac-
complished by the European gas reform. Natural gas prices and network tariffs were ex-
pected to be lowered and become cost-reflective. European companies involved in the 
transport of natural gas were supposed to increase their efficiency due to a reduction in 
their operating costs. Furthermore, the European Commission aims to fulfil its public ser-
vice obligation to secure the natural gas supply of the European Union by stimulating in-
vestments. According to the public regulation approach (Cox 1999; Genoud and Finger 
2004), markets are organised by a combination of two objectives: first order economic 
regulation predominantly addressing the structure, conduct and economic performance 
(e.g. price development) and second order political and social regulation, predominantly 
addressing the politically defined performance (e.g. security of gas supply). Thereafter, 
investments can be perceived as general economic performance indicators or more spe-
cifically as a public service obligation performance indicator.  
 
                                                 
4 In addition, the study takes into account the impact of the legal provisions for the gas reform and energy 
policy objectives on the evolution of European gas market regulation.  
5 Regulatory regimes are defined as the bundle of institutional arrangements triggered by the liberalisation 
process in the context of European gas reform. 
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4.1 Efficiency 
The field of economics contains efficiency as a central idea as a means by which it can 
ultimately strive to improve social welfare. In the literature there is a difference distin-
guished between productive and allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency is achieved 
when goods are produced in the least costly manner. Allocative efficiency is realised in 
the case where resources are allocated so as to maximise the welfare of a society. Effi-
ciency can be conceptualised in various ways. Labour productivity is a prominent indica-
tor for efficiency in the research on privatisation (Megginson and Netter 2001). Effi-
ciency can also be perceived as whether incentive regulation in the form of price cap 
regulation is in place or not. Price cap regulation employs an efficiency factor to stimu-
late the reduction the operating costs of the distribution or transmission operators by 
regulating the prices of their network tariffs. Turvey sets out conceptual clarifications on 
how to perceive efficiency in the electricity sector and outlines methodological improve-
ments to conduct short-run and long-run network efficiency comparisons for electricity 
distribution (2006). Steiner elaborated on the conceptualisation of efficiency for the elec-
tricity supply industry discussing possible proxies such as labour productivity (output per 
unit input), capital or total factor productivity (2001). Moreover, she adds utilisation rate 
and distance of actual reserve margins of capacities from “optimal” reserve margins to 
account for efficiency.6 Some indicators were for several reasons not feasible and had to 
be rejected upfront. The ones she included, utilization rate and optimal reserve margin, 
are proxies imperfectly representing efficiency. On the basis of her data, Steiner observes 
a positive correlation between unbundling and the utilisation rate. However, the impact of 
regulation on the reserve margins remains indefinite, because the operationalization of 
the indicator did not account for the starting position of individual countries and its rela-
tive increase overtime. (Steiner 2001: 167, 173) 
The supply industry and production of natural gas are not subject to European liberalisa-
tion policy. Therefore, indicators related to the performance of the supply industry are not 
of core interest when verifying the effect of regulation-for-competition on the efficiency 
of the regulated transport companies. In this context, the utilization rate (which is under-
stood as used transport capacity) qualifies as a potential indicator for efficiency. In the 
literature, one study measures efficiency in the natural gas market by analysing com-
pany’s productivity. Lee et. al. compare the performance of 28 natural gas transport utili-
ties in eight developed countries between 1987 and 1995. The article presents a method 
that enables the comparison of profits, price differentials and productivity of transmission 
utilities and integrated utilities. The authors point out that productivity is determined by 
various factors such as utility size, customer density, regulatory environment etc. They 
observe that utility size and pipeline utilization are statistically significant. Productivity 
differences are largely attributed to the so-called utility dummy which functions as an 
umbrella variable for various utility-specific and country-specific factors (Lee, Park et al. 
1999). In short, productivity in natural gas transport utilities7 can be measured, but 
whether for instance the company organisation is more responsible for efficiency in-
                                                 
6 The utilisation is calculated as energy production divided by total average capacity. The optimal reserve 
margin is generated on the basis of a benchmarking procedure and the reserve margin is calculated as the 
difference between capacity and peak demand, divided by peak demand. (Steiner 2001: 164) 
7 The sample consists of two subgroups, transmission utilities and integrated utilities.  
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creases than is regulation, has not been controlled for. Consequently, a differential analy-
sis would be necessary to verify the effect of regulation-for-competition on efficiency in 
the gas transport sector.  
Another example of research on the efficiency of the natural gas sector has been de 
Joode’s attempt to estimate the impact of two new infrastructure projects with different 
institutional arrangements on efficiency performance of the capacity market. In its re-
search design, regulation is initially perceived as an intervening variable, but occurs 
within the interpretation of results on the performance side as well. In the context of the 
UK-Dutch case, de Joode points to the application of price cap regulation by the UK 
regulator Ofgem which imposed an overall efficiency factor of 2% on the natural gas 
transport companies. In his conclusion, he implies a direct benefit for the consumers 
stemming from the application of the incentive regulation without any further specifica-
tion or measurement. Although his reasoning is logical, in doing so, de Joode runs the 
risk of making a circular argument. (De Joode 2007)   
4.2 Natural gas prices  
Assessing the impact of regulation on natural gas prices has two main obstacles: one be-
ing that it is conceptual in nature and the other that it is not reinforced by a sufficient 
number of cases and has the corresponding problems of data availability. A conceptual 
problem arises due to the fact that natural gas prices are not based on gas to gas competi-
tion. Instead, natural gas prices are still linked to the oil price. Moreover, a general clari-
fication concerning natural gas prices should be stated upfront. In the media it is often 
referred to >the< gas price, which certainly is a simplification of the complexity of natu-
ral gas prices. There are numerous gas prices generated on different markets and market 
levels. On the national level, Phillip Wright shows how the UK market is differentiated 
into separate but connected markets such as the domestic consumer market, over-the-
counter and on-the-day commodity trade, which leads to the generation of different gas 
prices (Wright 2006). As a result of contract pluralism, gas prices are most commonly 
distinguished between export, import and spot market prices or with respect to the con-
sumer group (industrial and consumer prices). Historically, Western European price for-
mulation in the natural gas sector is predominantly based on the concept of ‘market value 
principles’. These principles “may be summarised as suggesting that gas should be priced 
either: so as to be at or near parity with crude oil, or so as to be competitive with the final 
consumer’s alternative non-gas fuels, or so as to reflect historic costs of gas production” 
(International Energy Agency cited after Stern 2007: 1). Consequently, gas price formula 
within European contracts contain an oil indexation as well as several other factors re-
flecting production and transportation costs or the companies profit margin.8 To sum up, 
the composition of these formulas and the weighting of factors do differ substantially 
across different market levels. Data on natural gas prices for which the influence of the 
oil price development is subtracted out of the equation are to the knowledge of the au-
thors not available. Although we do not have so-called ‘oil price-adjusted’ gas prices at 
our disposal for conducting an econometric analysis, the energy sector investigations by 
Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) demonstrate the evidence of the link to 
                                                 
8 Austvik gives a brief and clear introduction into price formulation, contract clauses and effects of liberali-
sation on prices. Additionally, he explains different schemes of price regulation. (1997; 2003) 
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oil product prices (European Commission 2007e: 101-105). “From an analysis of more 
than 500 contracts covering more than 400 Bcm of gas supplies to the EU countries for 
the calendar year 2004, DG COMP found that two products – light fuel oil and gasoil, 
and heavy fuel oil – accounted for nearly 75 percent of price indexation.” (Stern 2007: 6). 
Apart from end-user gas prices and spot market prices, European gas prices are still not 
entirely transparent. 
Robinson analysed the question of whether European gas prices have converged by test-
ing for beta convergence9 on the basis of end-user gas prices without taxes for industry in 
six countries between 1978 and 2004. His sample is based upon Finland, France, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. The other nine old member states could not be in-
cluded due to a lack of data: “complete data on gas prices for the period under investiga-
tion was unavailable for Luxembourg, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Por-
tugal ,and Sweden” (Robinson 2007: 2348). It remains unclear why Greece has not been 
included. He vividly summarizes the results for the six countries under examination: 
“Eyeballing the data series suggests that national prices were quite widely spread during 
the early 1980s, began to fall and converge after 1985 but started to rise and diverge after 
1999.”10 (Robinson 2007: 2348) Robinson partially attributes the contradictory observa-
tions to the three different methodologies applied. Regardless of methodological consid-
erations, all approaches reject the expectation that end-user prices fall with the introduc-
tion of EU gas liberalisation. Given the limited scope and quality of this article, the result 
has to be treated with caution. 
Accompanying the 3rd Energy Package, the European Commission conducted an impact 
assessment, analysing the impact that certain regulatory instruments in the electricity and 
gas markets have on performance indicators. In this context, the European Commission 
attempts to empirically prove the impact of ownership unbundling on natural gas prices. 
The report concedes that electricity and gas prices “may not automatically decrease be-
cause of ownership unbundling” (European Commission 2007b: 37), and are instead de-
termined by several factors. Nevertheless, the analysis fails in providing a convincing 
reasoning as to what extent regulation accounts for gas price changes. With regard to 
electricity prices, the European Commission identifies a correlation between ownership 
unbundling and decreasing industrial and household prices. The Commission applies a 
methodology which does not compare actual price levels but cumulative and aggregated 
price changes. Changes in the electricity price were reduced by 3% for industrial cos-
tumers in member states with ownership unbundling, whereas the Commission observed 
a move up to 6 % in countries with integrated transmission system operators (TSO). Per-
cent changes of equivalent household prices appear even more divergent. Ownership un-
bundling at the distribution level is supposed to result in a 6% increase, while in member 
states with integrated transmission systems the operators account for approximately a 
                                                 
9 Robinson concisely explains: “To put it intuitively, a variable β-converges if countries with low original 
values of the respective variable – in this case gas prices – experience more rapid growth rates in this vari-
able than the other countries in the same sample.” (Robinson 2007: 2349) For a more detailed explanation 
of beta convergence see Haase (2008). 
10 The data is retrieved from the Economic and Social Data Services collected under the supervision of the 
International Energy Association. The Robinson text is ambiguous whether household end-user prices are 
included. For instance, he refers to household and industry gas prices in Figure 1 in his text, but in the text 
itself he explicitly states the data is based on industry prices.  
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30% increase. According to the report written under the lead of Directorate-General for 
Energy and Transport (DG TREN) “it is not possible to carry out the same comparison 
for gas prices” (European Commission 2007b: 38). The Commission’s conclusion builds 
mainly on the argument, that for most of the examination time an insufficient number of 
cases with ownership unbundling were available. We agree with this appraisal, but con-
sider the conceptual reservation even more relevant. In fact, controlling for the influence 
of one decisive factor within a complex formula has not been solved.   
Our next example as well advocates a long examination period, before a correlation be-
tween liberalisation and price development can be judged. Waddams analyses the effect 
of liberalising UK retail energy markets on consumers. She points out that retail energy 
prices were falling during the period from 1990 to 2002. Back then, the British govern-
ment in place attributed this success to their introduction of supplier choice and the re-
moval of price controls. Waddams expresses her doubt that this trend would still hold, 
when basic conditions in the market or market structure are changed. Rising oil prices 
and market concentration on the retail level exercised in the form of the “‘joint forma-
tion’ among these suppliers” might induce reversed effects (Waddams Price 2005: 142). 
More generally, Waddams concludes in 2005, that whether or not a regulated monopoly 
is less favourable than introducing competition in retail markets “depends crucially on the 
competitiveness of the market which emerges from the process, relative to the effective-
ness of regulation of the monopoly supplier” (2005: 132). Recent experience in the UK 
gas market shows that rising oil and gas wholesale prices feed through and increase con-
sumer prices. In this context, the British consumer organization Energywatch released 
some figures during their campaign critiquing rising energy prices: “Since 2003, British 
Gas customers have seen their bills go up by 76.7% for gas (from £370 to £653) and by 
74.3% for electricity (from £237 to £413). Customers taking both fuels from Britain’s 
biggest energy supplier have seen their bills go from £567 to £1049 over the same pe-
riod” (energywatch 2008, 18 January)11.  
4.3 Tariffs  
In general, tariffs could serve as indicators to analyse the impact of regulation-for-
competition on economic performance. Edwards & Waverman for instance choose to 
measure performance by analysing interconnect rates in the telecommunication sector 
(2006). Due to regulators both defining ex ante the tariff methodology and determining 
the level of tariffs by applying incentive regulation in a liberalised European market, the 
tariffs seem to be a part of the regulation and do not qualify as pure economic perform-
ance indicators. The conceptual demarcation between tariff and tariff regulation seems to 
be problematic; the variables are not fully independent from each other.12  
                                                 
11 Adam Scorer, Director of Campaigns of the UK energy watch, indirectly accused the energy companies 
to apply collusive pricing strategies by saying: “Four double digit rises in four weeks won't do much to 
persuade consumers that this market works in their interest. Four, supposedly cut-throat, competitors have 
raised their prices by near identical amounts in days of each other. This is a market where companies do not 
worry about competition for consumers.” (energywatch 2008, 1 February).   
12 The tariffs are consisting of several elements. In some countries, the costs that are subject to regulatory 
approval and/or incentive regulation are not more than 10-15% (Haase 2008). The rest are mainly capital 
cost related and operational cost which are to a large extend externally determined (fuel costs, electricity, 
data transfer etc.). Moreover, historical evolutions of tariff levels might need to be taken into account (rela-
 9
After the introduction of liberalisation the availability and quality of comparable tariffs 
across Europe has improved. For the last couple of years it has been possible to survey 
the tariff development by company or nation-wide average tariffs. Earlier research 
showed that data on tariffs for the EU 12 is often only available from 2002 onwards 
(Haase 2008). Caution should be used when comparing national average tariffs due to the 
lack of standardized definitions13. Some countries are very transparent and have docu-
mented their tariff development well (e.g. ECORYS Nederland BV 2006). The most 
comprehensive and publicly available collection of comparable tariff data are at present 
the benchmarking reports of the European Commission and tariff surveys of studies con-
ducted by Arthur D. Little (e.g. 2007). To conclude, due to conceptual objections com-
bined with insufficient data before and after the liberalisation, tariffs do not qualify to be 
included in an empirical test.  
4.4 So far so good? 
So far, the review of economic literature has shown that gas market regulation and its 
empirical effect on performance indicators like efficiency, natural gas prices and tariffs, 
has been hardly subjected to research. On the basis of the existing literature a correlation 
between the two variables cannot be verified. Moreover, we have demonstrated the ob-
stacles to conducting such an econometric analysis. A historical comparison of gas trans-
port utilities’ productivity in the EU 15 fails in the attempt to investigate the productivity 
of transport services within integrated utilities. The introduction of incentive regulations 
which employ efficiency factors certainly has a cost-reducing effect on the performance 
of natural gas transport. Nonetheless, the regulatory instrument determines by definition 
the performance in terms of efficiency. Consequently, the efficiency factor as a depend-
ent variable is dependent on the performance variable. Data on natural gas prices is not 
available for an EU-15 cross national comparison. Natural gas prices are influenced by 
the oil indexation of supply contracts and to a great extent influenced by oil prices. The 
influence of regulation can not be clearly extracted from other factors driving the gas 
prices. And finally, tariffs data is insufficiently available to allow a meaningful compari-
son.  
5. Impact of the regulation-for-competition on investments in the EU  
Concerns about the security of gas supplies have moved up the political agenda due to the 
huge cumulative need for investments in gas in the EU-15 countries, coupled with the 
fear of energy blackouts. According to the World Energy Investment Outlook, the total 
gas sector investment needed in OECD Europe, projected over the period 2001-2030, 
amounts to $465 billion, or almost $16 billion per year (2003: 266). In considering alter-
native and reference scenarios, the estimated cumulative gas investments in EU-15 coun-
tries between 2001-2030 amounted to: distribution $85-95 billion, transmission $50-75 
billion, storage $10-15 billion, liquefied natural gas (LNG) re-gasification $15-20 billion 
(International Energy Agency 2003: 271). The Californian crisis has shown that “sus-
tained periods of shortages caused by under investment or adverse hydrological condi-
                                                                                                                                                 
tive tariff development versus actual tariff level). Steiner discussed this problem in the context of compar-
ing the development of the actual and optimal reserve margin.  
13 Even if selected company tariffs serve as proxies for a national average tariff the problem of diverging 
definitions of tariffs is not solved. 
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tions may mean that market clearing prices can remain at high levels for lengthy periods 
and can produce politically unsustainable final prices to voting consumers” (Newbery 
2001: 91). Both opponents and proponents of European gas market liberalisation are 
questioning whether the current regulatory regimes in European energy markets will en-
sure sufficient investment. 
Proponents argue in line with the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, and claim 
that liberalised markets reduce monopoly rents and that consumer demand will ensure the 
necessary infrastructure is in place in a timely manner. For them, the measures are not 
sufficiently far-reaching: insufficient regulatory competencies and practice, combined 
with market power, runs the risk of not delivering the benefits of liberalisation. In con-
trast, opponents argue that liberalised markets do not provide enough incentives to ensure 
a sufficient level of investments. As a result, this line of argument suggests, underinvest-
ment might result in a failure to meet the security of supply obligations that the regula-
tory authorities are supposed to ensure. According to this view, the current regulatory re-
gimes have too few incentives to encourage investment. Instead, some advocate using the 
power of the market in times of worldwide demand-side competition14 (General Energy 
Council of the Netherlands 2005; Helm 2005: 11). “The argument that long-term con-
tracting supported by massively capitalised, vertically integrated national champions is 
the only way forward to ensure security of supply is difficult to refute in the absence of 
convincing alternative models” (Newbery 2001: 11). Both viewpoints hold some truth 
and generate relevant questions which need to be addressed. Nevertheless, the politicisa-
tion of discussions on the security of gas supply is not always helpful in finding solutions. 
Hence, there is a need for academic consideration and evaluation of the matter in hand 
since this promises a more balanced and systematic insight.  
5.1 Literature on investment in energy markets 
Historically, over-investment and excess capacity in energy markets was considered to be 
a serious concern before the privatisation and liberalisation of energy markets. In the 
1980s and 1990s, the New Public Management movement criticised public ownership for 
not being appropriate for delivering adequate efficiency and the capital liquidity needed 
to finance large-scale investments. Nowadays, theories relating to underinvestment in lib-
eralised markets are fashionable, and question whether competition-based approaches are 
appropriate for network-based industries with high sunk costs. In this context, economists 
have argued whether over- or under- investment is the more harmful for social welfare. 
Helm and Thompson (1991) suggested that, in general, the social costs of underinvest-
ment are higher than those of overinvestment. In the more recent literature this view 
seems to be widely accepted (von Hirschhausen, Bechers et al. 2004). Accordingly, over-
investment should be the preferable strategy. Risk aversion on both the consumer and the 
company side is a common argument for a less-liberal market design. The central justifi-
                                                 
14 The reasoning is that a concentration on the supply side requires a similar concentration on the demand 
side in order to be able to compete with other strong buyers from other regions and to negotiate favourable 
supply contracts with the large gas producers such as Gazprom.  
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cation for this proposition stems from the apparent consumers’ willingness to pay for se-
curity of supply.15
Addressing the impact of regulation-for-competition on investment, the recent academic 
debate on liberalising energy and other utilities can be divided into at least two camps. 
One applies econometric modelling, trying to analyse correlations between regulatory 
variables and investment by conducting ‘large-n’ empirical analysis. The other set of eco-
nomic studies concentrates mainly on the electricity sector and tends to be theory-driven. 
Unlike the first set of studies, the latter refers to empirical developments in the form of 
case studies or illustrations that provide limited evidence, but are not designed as empiri-
cal tests.  
In the econometric studies, the impact of regulation variables on investment is indirectly 
researched by using, for instance, the generation capacity installed in electricity markets 
as a proxy for investment decisions. A cross-national study analysing 38 countries, in-
cluding countries with developing and OECD backgrounds, concluded that “well defined 
and credible political institutions are positively and significantly correlated with global 
electricity generation capacity” (Bergara, Henisz et al. 1997: 11). Cubbin and Stern 
(2006) reached the same conclusion after analysing 28 developing countries using data 
covering the period between 1980 and 2001.  
The predominantly qualitative studies consider the likely impact of specific regulatory 
instruments, such as incentive regulations, on investment in the energy sector (Burns and 
Riechmann 2004; von Hirschhausen, Bechers et al. 2004; Cowan 2006). The strength of 
these studies lies in the micro-level explanatory power of firm behaviour. These analyses 
implicitly presuppose rational choice, from whence macro-economic phenomena become 
complex aggregates of individual decisions16. Drawing on spot- market pricing theory, 
Neuhoff and de Vries (2004) stress the importance of long-term contracts between elec-
tricity generators and retail companies in changing the incentives for investing in electric-
ity generation capacity. Keller and Wilde (2004) emphasise the need of locational tariff 
price signals and multilateral coordination mechanisms to provide incentives and the nec-
essary conditions.17 Both these articles conclude that, under the current regime for elec-
tricity regulation, incentives are insufficient to ensure long-term investments in the elec-
tricity sector. Burns and Riechmann (2004) adopt a more integrative stance when advo-
cating that the success of incentive-based regulation depends on how the parameters of 
the specific regulatory regime are defined. Across Europe, incentive-based regulation of 
gas markets has only been introduced in a few countries. Incentive regulation is still in its 
infancy outside the UK and the United States. The analysis of specific forms of incentive 
regulation, such as price caps, rate of return and yardstick regulation, and their possible 
impacts on business behaviour in terms of investment should provide useful insights, and 
lead to improvements and the fine-tuning of the regulatory incentive schemes beyond the 
electricity sector (Jamasb and Politt 2007). The bottom line is that scholars are far from 
convinced that the current liberal market design in the electricity sector is able to balance 
                                                 
15 The willingness to pay for security of supply certainly has its limits and might ultimately result in a 
change in the energy mix. One should also note that this proposition dates back to periods of comparatively 
low energy prices.  
16 The links between the mirco-, meso- and macro- levels are not explicitly explained or elaborated upon. 
17 The authors elaborate on the interdependence of transmission and generation. From this, incentives for 
investing in the grid will affect incentives for investing in generation capacity. (Keller and Wild 2004) 
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the uncertainty which market liberalisation induces. Although the qualitative reasoning 
put forward is reasonable, the literature requires empirical tests to allow generalisations 
to be made. With the current state of the literature, no definite answer is provided.  
 
5.2 Is there empirical evidence of a hold-up problem in the European gas markets? 
In electricity and natural gas research, the occurrence or danger of underinvestment in a 
liberalised energy market is predominantly interpreted as a hold-up problem (von Hirsch-
hausen, Bechers et al. 2004). An insufficient level of regulatory stability may result in the 
holding back of investments, meaning that investments are delayed or even never made. 
Investment distortions may arise due to the lack of certainty stemming from vertical dis-
integration and decreasing contract periods. According to Williamson (1985), industries 
with long asset lives and a high proportion of sunk costs need to reduce risk through ei-
ther vertical integration or by concluding long term (supply) contracts along the value 
chain. In reality, once an investment is sunk, the company is tied to the market and reliant 
on it for returns on their investment. Uncertainty can arise from the regulator’s decision, 
after the investment has been made, to renegotiate prices or expropriate parts of the verti-
cally integrated company. Industry sees the possible compulsion to unbundle ownership, 
enforced by European provisions, as an act of expropriation18. In interpreting the hold-up 
problem, regulators structurally face a lack of policy credibility. Spanjer (2006: 5) con-
cisely summarised the situation “the essence is that a typical regulator is not able to 
credibly commit ex post to a regulatory rule, making the rule incredible ex ante”. Experi-
ence suggests that regulatory rules are erratically or periodically subjected to change. An 
example of erratic change is the introduction of ownership unbundling, even if long 
forewarned and well prepared. On the other hand, pricing regulations are reviewed and 
determined every 3-5 years and this is a typical example of a periodic change that influ-
ences the pricing structure and profitability of the company since, on the supply side, it is 
contractually bound by longer-term arrangements. Therefore, price regulation has the po-
tential to negatively affect the returns on investments and hence the asset value of the 
company, raising fear of a “stranded asset” (Helm and Jenkinson 2001). To sum up, the 
lack of political credibility translates into uncertainty over the returns on an investment, 
and this increases the likelihood of declining investments, delaying investments or alter-
ing the timing of an investment decision through opportunistic behaviour. In the context 
of investing in gas transmission and distribution networks, opportunistic behaviour could 
result in an incumbent operator being inclined not to invest, or postponing such a deci-
sion, in case this led to competitors being given market access through the increased 
transport capacity19. Moreover, natural gas companies seek to reduce uncertainty by op-
posing ownership unbundling and applying for Third Party Exemptions for new invest-
                                                 
18 The Commission’s line of legal argumentation is briefly summarised in a DG COMP’s Newsletter 
(Lowe, Pucinskaite et al. 2007).  
19 In general, an economic agent or organisation is seen as behaving opportunistically if it quickly adapts to 
the opportunity structure, and votes for its own advantage. Opportunistic behaviour might even imply unle-
gal behaviour. Burns and Riechmann (2004: 216-217) show that companies are responsive to opportunities 
provided by incentive regulation schemes and adjust the timing of their investments in line with regulatory 
cycles. The latter is called the periodicity effect and discussed in the context of incentive regulations ap-
plied to the electricity sector. 
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ment projects. These exemptions prevent competitors profiting from their investment and, 
at the same time, allow long-term booking of capacity.  
The authors have not been able to find any published study which analyses whether the 
European Union faces hold-up problems in practice. Ideally, such a study would compare 
the optimum investment level with the actual investments in the natural gas sector to em-
pirically substantiate the occurrence or not of hold-up problems. Adopting a different 
line, Spanjer (2006) proposed a purely theoretical approach for evaluating whether a 
hold-up problem is likely in gas markets under the current European provisions. In a first 
step, he deduced seven criteria, relevant to the occurrence of a hold-up problem, which 
effect policy credibility. These criteria cover the presence of sunk investments, rapid de-
mand growth, rate of capital depreciation, degree of technological development, private 
ownership of the company, investors profits and the regulator’s discount factors. The last 
of these reflect the extent do to which the regulator values future benefits over present-
day gains. He concludes that the majority of these seven, theoretically-deduced, criteria 
would induce a low policy credibility, suggesting the likelihood of a hold-up problem. 
The evaluation of the criteria and their effect on policy credibility is purely argumenta-
tive, there are no empirical references to the actual situation in European gas markets. 
This procedure seems to have three significant shortcomings. Firstly, Spanjer puts for-
ward a schematic argument when comparing the number of criteria which seem to be in 
favour of encouraging a hold-up problem with the number against. The reasoning used 
assumes all criteria have equal impacts on policy credibility. On the contrary, we would 
argue, for example, that a low rate of technological development in the natural gas sector 
would be far less important than a huge demand increase which would create interdepen-
dency between regulator and industry. Secondly, he does not take the exemption regime 
of the European Union into account. Thirdly, the argument lacks empirical substance. 
Rather than concentrating on the theoretical impact of policy credibility, we would sug-
gest examining how contract durations develop, including mirroring the actual regulatory 
practice with regard to exemptions from third party access (TPA) for investments, and 
assessing the investments in the European gas markets before and after liberalisation. 
These three features might be responsible to foreclose an empirical test of the hold-up 
thesis in the context of European reform. 
 
5.3 Contract duration  
Although the duration of contracts plays a crucial role in shaping the industry’s invest-
ment incentives, little light has been shone on the details of natural gas supply contracts. 
Both the industry and governments classify such information as sensitive, whether this be 
for commercial reasons or for security-of-supply concerns. It could be argued that full 
transparency with respect to the current and future demand and supply situations, and ac-
companying trading terms, would create an information asymmetry between producing 
and consuming countries. Neumann and von Hirschhausen shed some light on the con-
tract landscape by reviewing 317 worldwide long-term natural gas contracts, of which 
132 were signed in Europe between 1963 and 2005. Especially in the European context, 
the authors faced considerable obstacles in obtaining data20: “there seems to be no better 
secret kept in European trade than which company is supplying natural gas under which 
                                                 
20 Open source literature was complemented by expert interviews.  
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conditions” (Neumann and von Hirschhausen 2005: 10). According to Neumann and von 
Hirschausen, contract durations decreased significantly as natural gas markets became 
more competitive. Experiences of US gas market liberalisation suggest that the average 
contract duration shortens after the ending of a monopoly, to a period ranging from 8 to 
15 years. Furthermore, long durations seem to promote the willingness to accept higher 
volumes in contracts. In the same publication, Neumann and von Hirschhausen observed 
that  asset-specific investments make the difference: “Contracts that have been signed in 
combination with exploration of new resources or building of new infrastructure are on 
average seven years longer in duration in Europe  and [more generally by] almost three 
years for all contracts [than those in America]”(Neumann and von Hirschhausen 2005). 
At least in the European context, this finding might be related to the practice of TPA ex-
emptions in the EU. As we will show in the next section, virtually all major new invest-
ments can avoid granting TPA. Accordingly, for all supply contracts related to new LNG 
or pipeline projects a quasi-monopolistic situation has been created. In this environment, 
it is only natural that European contracts are, on average, longer.  
 
5.4 European TPA exemption practice and the impact of unbundling on investment 
A conceptual problem arises when trying to analyse the effect of European regulation-
for-competition on investment due to the introduction of exemptions in Article 22 of the 
second Gas Directive: how to measure the impact of competition on investments when 
the related competition measures do not apply to new investment projects? In this section 
we will first summarise the exemption provisions and then demonstrate the significance 
of exemptions by analysing EU exemption practice. Following this, we will reflect on the 
European Commission’s claim that ownership unbundling, as part of the regulatory re-
gime, has an empirically verifiable positive effect on investments and consider whether 
this assertion is justified.  
Since 2004, any undertaking which is planning new major infrastructure or the substan-
tial upgrading of existing infrastructure can apply for TPA exemptions. Article 22 of the 
second Gas Directive allows third parties to be excluded from access to transmission and 
distribution systems, interconnectors, LNG facilities, storage and upstream pipeline net-
works. The Directive distinguishes between full and partial exemptions (European Com-
mission 2003). In the case of a full exemption, the owner of the infrastructure has full 
rights over its full capacity. Consequently, there is no need for public tariffs or dispute 
settlement procedures. The regulatory authorities cannot intervene either ex ante or ex 
post. When infrastructure projects are partially exempted, the owner is obliged to offer a 
certain capacity to other market players. The available capacity is most commonly allo-
cated using an open season procedure or an auction mechanism, and the regulator has to 
approve the method of allocation. As with a full exemption, the regulator acquires no far-
reaching regulatory powers (European Commission 2004). Exemptions are subject to a 
two-stage decision-making process during which the designated national regulatory au-
thority assesses the company’s request and formulates conditions on which a reasoned 
decision is based. In the second step, the Commission reviews the decision of the national 
authority and decides whether to give the exemption final approval.21 Decisions are made 
                                                 
21 In the case of an interconnector pipeline, the national regulatory authorities of the countries linked by the pipeline are 
involved. Should the national authorities and the Commission come to conflicting decisions, Articles 3 and 7 of Deci-
sion 1999/468/EC shall apply (Article 22, Point 4). 
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on the basis of criteria formulated within the Directive and supplemented by an explana-
tory note.    
 
Box 1: Criteria for granting an exemption based on Art. 22,  
            Directive 2003/55/EC  
 
(a)  the investment must enhance competition in gas supply and 
enhance security of supply; 
(b)  the level of risk attached to the investment is such that the investment 
 would not take place unless an exemption is granted; 
(c)  the infrastructure must be owned by a natural or legal person which is sepa-
rate, at least in terms of its legal form, from the system operators in whose 
systems that interconnector will be built; 
        (d) charges are levied on users of that infrastructure; 
(f)  the exemption is not to the detriment of competition or the effective func-
tioning of the internal gas market, or the efficient 
functioning of the regulated system to which the infrastructure is connected. 
 
Source: European Commission (2004) 
 
In general, the granting of exemptions is an indication that the policy objective of secu-
rity of gas supply has been prioritised over a purist application of regulation-for-
competition. Nevertheless, such a norm-based interpretation has limited supporting evi-
dence, unless it can be substantiated by analysing exemption practice in the EU between 
2004 and 2007. For this purpose, we compiled a list of all infrastructural projects that 
were granted exemptions (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Exemptions granted under Article 22 of Gas Directive 2003/55/EC 
Receipt of 
notification Project name 
Country and na-
tional authority 
Activity 
exempted 
Investment 
volume Duration 
8.11.2007 Nabucco Gas Pipeline 
Austria, E-control 
(the Austrian regula-
tor) 
Inter-
connector 
Approx. € 5 
billion  (unknown) 
23.07.2007 Eemshaven LNG terminal 
The Netherlands, 
Ministry of Econom-
ics Affairs 
LNG Termi-
nal €800 million  (unknown) 
18.7.2007 LionGas Ter-minal 
The Netherlands, 
Ministry of Econom-
ics Affairs 
LNG Termi-
nal 
€650 mil-
lion* (unknown) 
04.05.2007 
Grain LNG 
Terminal 
(phase 1+2) 
United Kingdom, The 
Gas and Electricity 
Market Authority 
(Ofgem) 
LNG Termi-
nal €485 million  
20/25/20 years for 
the three phases 
23.2.2007 Poseidon Pipe-line 
Greece, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs 
Inter-
connector €350 million 25 years 
23.11.2006 Gate Terminal Rotterdam 
The Netherlands, 
Ministry of Econom-
LNG Termi-
nal €800 million  
20 years (25 years 
requested, but 
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ics Affairs amended by Dutch 
regulator) 
15.4.2005 Brindisi LNG Terminal 
Italy, Ministry of 
Productive Activities 
LNG Termi-
nal €390 million  
20 years**, par-
tially for 80% of 
new capacity 
12.4.2005 
Bacton-
Balgzand 
Pipeline 
(BBL) 
United Kingdom and 
Netherlands, Ofgem 
and the Dutch Minis-
try of Economics 
Affairs 
Inter-
connector €500 million  
10 or 15 years, 
depending on the 
proportion of the 
capacity consid-
ered 
3.2.2005 Milford Haven Dragon   
United Kingdom, 
Ofgem 
LNG Termi-
nal 
£250 million 
(€336 mil-
lion)*** 
25 years 
1.12.2004 
South Hook 
LNG, Milford 
Haven 
United Kingdom, 
Ofgem 
LNG Termi-
nal 
€1067 mil-
lion  25 years
1.12.2004 
Isle of Grain 
LNG Terminal 
(phase 1) 
United Kingdom, 
Ofgem 
LNG Termi-
nal (phase 1) 
Included in 
above as above 
3.12.2004 North Adriatic LNG Terminal 
Italy, Ministry of 
Productive Activities TPA €835 million 
80% TPA exemp-
tion for 25 years  
(20% TPA) 
 
(*) Authors’ estimation. Official investment figure not published. 
(**) Based on the length of the contracts  
(***) Based on January 2008 exchange rate  
 
Sources: European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas (2007, September), European Commission 
Website >http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas/infrastructure/exemptions_en.htm<, and various project websites.  
 
In 2007, the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) presented an 
overview of projects which had applied for an exemption under Article 22. ERGEG listed 
ten LNG projects of which eight have been approved and two are pending (Extension to 
the Isle of Grain phase 3 and OLT Offshore Livorno). Out of four interconnector projects, 
three have been granted exemptions from third party access. At the beginning of 2008, 
three decisions concerning onshore extensions belonging to the North European Gas 
Pipeline were pending. In other words, between 2004 and 2007, 11 new infrastructure 
projects have received exemptions based on Article 22. These add up to a total invest-
ment of approximately €11.2 billion Euros. Except for the BBL interconnector, exemp-
tions were granted for 20-25 years. Depending on the capacity allocation mechanism, the 
impact on the potential market competition and liquidity is considerable. When a TPA 
exemption is granted, the facility owners might negotiate and share out the primary ca-
pacity rights. With secondary capacity rights, the use-it-or-lose-it principle applies. Some 
of these projects allocate their primary capacity using an open season procedure, a special 
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form of auction.22 Capacity allocation practice varies among the investment projects.23 
The Italian projects have tended to allocate their capacity through negotiations; whereas 
the British projects, such as South Hook LNG, Dragon LNG and the BBL interconnector, 
use either an auction for long term reservations or an open season mechanism (European 
Regulators' Group for Electricity and Gas 2007, September). What we observe is that re-
cent infrastructure projects to bring new tradable gas to the European markets exclude 
third party access and so potentially enable vertical foreclosure to thrive. Vertical fore-
closure is here understood to be obstacles to competition that arise from the vertical inte-
gration of companies active in the supply and network business. Nevertheless, the Euro-
pean Commission was able to draw positive conclusions from its energy sector inquiry:  
 
“Traditionally LNG has been imported by national incumbents who also own LNG 
terminals, which has not permitted the potential [of] imports to increase down-
stream competition to be realised. Recent trends, however, point to more capacity 
going to new entrants and to producers themselves. This is likely to have a positive 
impact on fostering downstream competition unless such effects are frustrated by 
access, LNG storage or emission rules with negative effects on competition, or by 
anti-competitive behaviour.” (European Commission 2007a, January 10: 282) 
 
The unfavourable rules, which might result in suboptimal competition, are not specified, 
and solutions to prevent a negative impact are not addressed in this context. Creating 
conditions in which new entrants come into play is necessary but certainly not sufficient 
to ensure downstream competition in the market. To reach a judgement as to whether 
competition will develop, it would be useful to make public the allocation of capacity in 
these new investment companies across Europe. It seems that the European Commission 
advocates competition along the complete value chain, rather than competition within and 
across all parts of the value chain.  
To sum up, all the formal requests for exemption so far evaluated have received approval. 
The European Commission does not keep records of companies that make informal en-
quiries about exemptions but then fail to formally apply (whether due to negative feed-
back or any other reason). Therefore, it is not possible to compare the number of informal 
                                                 
22 Some projects deviate from the norm by exercising an open season procedure on a voluntary basis, or by 
not conforming with the obligation to allocate capacity using an open season procedure at all (European 
Regulators' Group for Electricity and Gas 2007, September)  
23 LNG companies criticise the use-it-or-lose-it (UIOLI) principle because it shifts the risks to the LNG 
company while offering free-riding potential to opportunistic market players. In general, an LNG company 
needs to provide greater re-gasification capacity than LNG cargo capacity to ensure the gas flow is main-
tained. The need to run an LNG terminal in combination with a re-gasification facility with asymmetric 
capacity results in often not being able to use the whole capacity through prior booking. If this market 
situation is genuinely structural, and a use-it-or-lose-it regime is employed, then other market players could 
specialise in buying capacity in the secondary market at rock-bottom prices without sharing any of the 
risks. Moreover, the danger of cross-subsidising free-riders might lead other market players to refrain from 
signing long-term take-or-pay contracts. This line of reasoning, advanced by LNG businesses, argues that 
the application of UIOLI principles in effect decreases the competitiveness of Europe as an LNG destina-
tion. In times of a worldwide demand-side competition for LNG cargos, the EU runs the risk that the 
United States or Asia could offer a better investor-oriented market environment and thus succeed in becom-
ing market makers. For further information see the NERA Economic Consulting Report on third party ac-
cess to LNG Terminals (2006, 10 November) 
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and formal requests with the number of approved requests. Measuring the impact of regu-
lation-for-competition on investment is thus problematic in terms of the dependent vari-
able because, in practice, third party access is not granted to new investment projects. In 
other words, the policy objective of achieving security-of-supply is prioritised over a pur-
ist application of regulation-for-competition.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Econometric research has brought about numerous comparative studies on utility reforms 
across the world and has explored the explanatory power of the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm. The literature review revealed that the effect of regulation-for-
competition on economic performance is not straight forward and it is hard to control for 
single factors in complex multi-factor equations. However, a misinterpretation of causes 
and effects might lead to the wrong policy recommendations and as a result decrease pol-
icy credibility and social welfare. After all, the following is a common conclusion of 
these econometric models: to achieve favourable economic performance within a liberal 
market organization, competition has to be put in place in conjunction with privatisation 
and credible regulation. Whereas the assessment of regulatory regimes in European gas 
markets has been carried out, their correlation to economic performance indicators ap-
pears to be more challenging. The effect of single regulatory instruments like third party 
access or unbundling has not been subject to substantial research and even then the re-
sults are contradictory. More research in this regard is necessary, before a conclusion can 
be reached. Discussion on the factors determining natural gas prices has directed the at-
tention back to the basic conditions of the scp paradigm. The oil price indexation of natu-
ral gas prices demonstrates the importance of basic conditions in shaping economic per-
formance in natural gas markets. In the energy sector, some basic conditions such as a 
country’s resource base, oil price development, access capacity and the degree of world-
wide demand side competition do profoundly influence gas prices and security of supply. 
Changes of those basic conditions therefore need to be given systematic attention and 
control in econometric research equations and qualitative analyses alike.  
The literature review additionally revealed that systematic analyses of the effect of regu-
lation-for-competition on investment do not exist. In our attempt to empirically substanti-
ate the claimed hold-up problem in European gas markets, three findings emerged. 
Firstly, as Neumann and von Hirschhausen show, the duration of supply contracts has 
decreased less in the European liberalised gas market than elsewhere. Moreover, invest-
ment uncertainty related to contract duration depends on the relevant exemption practice 
and can therefore only be judged on a case-by-case basis. Secondly, the European Com-
mission and its national regulatory dependants approved all 11 formal exemption requests 
received between 2004 and 2007 for new investment projects. These reflect a total in-
vestment of approximately €11.2 billion in infrastructure for which there is no obligation 
to grant third party access. Our attempt to empirically quantify the extent to which the EU 
is suffering from a hold-up problem did not succeed because the optimal investment 
level, with which we could compare the current situation, remains undefined. Neverthe-
less, the industry’s strong opposition to ownership unbundling coupled with the popular-
ity of exemptions allowing long-term contracts does indicate that the general argument in 
favour of a hold-up problem has empirical support. Thirdly, due to the way the European 
market was organised prior to liberalisation, investment levels in the natural gas sector in 
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general, and in transmission systems in particular, are not sufficiently clear to allow a 
systematic comparison. Investment figures tend to be misleading in the sense that they 
reflect ongoing developments. Consequently, the effect of regulatory regimes on invest-
ment in the gas sector as a whole cannot be scientifically verified on the basis of an EU-
wide comparison.  
Taking a positivist standpoint, we have demonstrated that a verification of whether or not 
regulation-for-competition positively correlates with favourable economic performance is 
not possible due to conceptual and data constraints. The liberalisation of European gas 
markets and related regulation has certainly had an impact on economic performance in 
the form of gas prices, efficiency and security of supply. We argue the current evalua-
tions and econometric models do not convincingly measure the impact of regulation to 
allow a verification of the underlying theoretical assumptions of the gas reform. This 
might be considered bad news for those who believe a positive impact is a matter of fact. 
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